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VfCTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
The so-called umbrella clause in bilateral investment agreements between states is 
one of the most controversial standards of protection in international investment 
arbitration. This paper will discuss three issues arising with regards to the 
interpretation and the scope of the clause. The most relevant case law on the topic 
will be presented and analysed, as well as early developments of the clause. 
One issue debated intensely is whether the umbrella clause allows foreign investor to 
bring purely contractual claims before an arbitral tribunal established under ICSID. 
It is argued in the paper that this is only possible if the alleged state act violating the 
contractual agreement involves sovereign state behaviour. 
Furthermore, the problem of competing jurisdiction that arises when a contractual 
dispute mechanism provides for the jurisdiction of domestic courts or domestic 
arbitration, but at the same time an ICSID tribunal is conferred jurisdiction by virtue 
of an umbrella clause is discussed. It is argued in the paper that the contractual 
jurisdiction clause should be given priority unless there is a case of denial of 
enforcement of the domestic award or a change in legislation that targets the fireign 
investment. 
Finally, the effect of the umbrella clause on locally incorporated subsidiaries of a 
foreign investor is analysed. The umbrella clause can only apply if Article 25(2)(b) 
of the ICSID convention is not deprived of any meaning or if the locally 
incorporated subsidiary may be considered as an "investment" of the foreign 
investor. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 15 008 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial standards of investment protection in bilateral 
investment treaties are the so-called "umbrella clauses", which are to be found in nearly 
every investment treaty and appear in many variations. The clause appeared first in the 
1959 Germany-Pakistan B1T 1 and has become a regular feature in bilateral investment 
treaties. Umbrella clauses create the obligation for host states to observe their contractual 
obligations with the foreign investor at all times, and in case of a breach of obligation 
they provide the medium through which investors may invoke proceedings by an arbitral 
tribunal established under the ICSID convention. Thus they represent a very important 
tool for the protection of foreign investments. Yet with respect to their usually very 
general wording, they open up the possibility of a very broad interpretative spectrum, 
which in turn entails a range of issues and questions that have sparked heated debates 
amongst scholars and arbitrators alike. Their significance, their scope of application and 
their effect on disputes arising out of investor-state contracts are in the obscure. 
Until recently, umbrella clauses did not receive a lot of attention in the field of 
investor-state arbitration, but in the past few years the number of cases concerned with 
the issues surrounding the interpretation and the application of the clause has grown 
considerably. A number of open questions have been identified, and efforts to find an 
answer have been made. Yet the disputes are characterized by a high level of 
inconsistency regarding the outcome of the decisions and awards, the results of 
interpretation and the level of argumentation by the respective tribunals differs 
significantly. The outcome of the respective interpretations affects primarily the law 
applicable to a contractual dispute (national or international) and the question of 
jurisdiction of either an ICSID tribunal or a domestic court or arbitral tribunal. 
This paper will deal with the question of the effect of such clauses on the 
jurisdiction of tribunals established under the !CS ID-convention regarding claims arising 
1 Katia Yannaca-Small " Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements" (2006) 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Working Papers on International 
Investment, www.occd.org (last accessed 14.09.2008). 
out of investment contracts. Furthermore, the problem of whether umbrella clauses in 
consequence invalidate forum selection clauses in investment contracts will be subject of 
discussion. Finally, it will be discussed if a foreign investor's locally incorporated 
subsidiary is included by the protective umbrella as a third party. 
II THE EFFECT OF "UMBRELLA CLAUSES": A SOURCE OF DISPUTES 
A The Function and Purpose of Umbrella Clauses in BITs 
1 The many-named monster 
In principle, umbrella clauses define the scope of disputes that fall under the 
protection, the "umbrella", of a bilateral investment treaty. The umbrella clause in the 
Germany-China BIT for example encompasses disputes regarding "investments in [the 
other Contracting Party 's] territory by investors of the other Contracting Party."2 BIT 
practice regarding the design of such clauses is not consistent and thus the scope of 
protection varies. The Belgium-China BIT, for example, does not include a reference to 
"investments" of the other party but merely refers to "any obligations".3 Such clauses are 
often included in treaties in order to protect foreign investments and contractual rights by 
making the state internationally responsible for either a breach of contract or any 
unilateral act that might deprive the investor of his or her rights. 4 For this reason , the 
umbrella clause is also known as "observance obligation clause", ''pacta sunt servanda 
clause" or "sanctity of contract clause". 
2 Outlining the problem 
It was not until two tribunals in 2004 had to deal with the same clause and 
rendered completely opposed awards within half a year that the umbrella clause received 
any significant attention in the field of investor-state arbitration. 5 Both tribunals were 
2 
\,\ ww.unctadxi .org (last accessed 15 July 2008). 
3 Ibid . 
4 Chri stoph Schreuer "Travelling the BIT Route - Of Wailing Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the 
Road" (2004) 5 J . W .I.T. 23 I , 25 0; Bjorn Kun oy "S inging in the Rain - Developments in the 
lnterprelation of Umbrella Clauses" (2006) 7 J .W.I.T. 275 , 276. 
5 SGS v Pakistan (SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Decision on 
2 
faced with the question of whether a breach of the investment contract, governed by the 
host State's law, would, by virtue of the umbrella clause, be transformed into a breach of 
the investment treaty and thus of international law.6 This is the problem at the core of all 
questions relating to umbrella clauses, and due to the many variations of the clause in 
existing BlTs it seems near impossible to find a standardized solution. ft is not to be 
confused with the principle that an IC SID tribunal has jurisdiction over treaty claims, 
even if they arise out of an underlying investment contract. 7 The consequences of 
answering this question in the affirmative is that an ICSID tribunal established under the 
respective BIT not only has jurisdiction over the dispute, but would also be able to apply 
international law to the formerly purely contractual dispute. 8 But does that also mean that 
the very nature of the claim is changed by virtue of an umbrella clause from contractual 
to international? This has been contended by Tribunals and scholars alike,9 and this is 
where the interests of foreign investors and States clash, as investors usually prefer 
[CSID arbitration over the host State 's domestic courts as the more (politically) neutral 
and efficient dispute resolution forum. Furthermore, in most cases it would be easier for 
the foreign investor to prove the violation of a contractual obligation than the violation of 
a substantive treaty standard, 10 which is why a broad interpretation of the respective 
umbrella clause would bring arbitration under ICSID within reach more easily. Does the 
inclusion of an umbrella clause in a BIT thus have the effect of altering the choice of law 
made by the parties in favour of the application of international law? Attached to the 
question of whether umbrella clauses transform contractual obligations governed by 
Objections to Jurisdiction)) (2004) 8 ICS ID Reports 352; SGS v Philippines 
(SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Republic of the Philippines - on Objections lo Jurisdiction)) 
(2004) 8 ICSID Reports 515. 
6 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: substantive principles (Oxford 
University Press , Oxford, 2007), 4 .97. 
7 Stanimir A. Alexandrov " Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty - The Jurisdiction oJTreaty-based 
Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v.Pakistan and SGS v. Phi/ippines" 
(2004) 4 W.I.T. 555, 559. 
8 Unless the parties had explicitly agreed on the application of the host State's law to the di spute, which 
would not allow a tribunal to apply international law. 
9 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)) (2007) 19 
World Trade and Arbitration Materials 227, 95(c); August Reini sch "U mbrella C lauses" (2006 Seminar 
o n In vestment Protection, Vienna, 12 September 2006), 14. 
JO Ethan G. Shenkman/Jason File Recent Developments in Investment Treaty Jurisprudence: Arbitrating 
Contract Claims Under Umbrella Clauses The Internati onal Comparative Lega l Guide to : International 
Arbitration (Global Legal Group Ltd ., London, 2007), 7. 
3 
domestic law into treaty-based claims is the issue of whether choice of forum clauses in 
favour of domestic courts, expressly agreed to by the parties, can be disregarded in view 
of the existence of an umbrella clause, activating the treaty remedies. In the event of the 
clash of jurisdiction of a treaty-based tribunal and domestic remedies, does the existence 
of an umbrella clause cause the domestic jurisdiction to be overridden by the jurisdiction 
of the treaty-based tribunal? Another field of scholarly dispute is the question of whether 
investment contracts with third parties, such as locally incorporated subsidiaries or state-
owned entities, are covered by the protection of umbrella clauses. The uncertainties 
surrounding umbrella clauses in BITs are thus numerous on all levels. It is not clear what 
sort of protection these clauses contain specifically in the case of acts that simultaneously 
violate the investment contract as well as the treaty. Do they provide an additional 
protection for the investor with regard to ICSID access or merely a restatement of the 
state ' s obligation to comply with the BIT? Their effect on investment contracts with 
regard to claims, contractual jurisdiction clauses and parties to the contract is entirely 
uncertain. If one argues that they only confer jurisdiction on ICSID tribunals if treaty 
standards are violated, it becomes quite difficult to see how any freestanding effect may 
be attributed to such clauses at all , as the violation of a treaty standard is sufficient to 
invoke the jurisdiction of a treaty-based tribunal. The task that tribunals are faced with 
when it comes to the application of an umbrella clause is therefore to interpret it in a way 
that does not deprive contractual choices of law and contractual remedies of any meaning 
while applying it as an independent treaty standard. 
B Contractual Claims "elevated" to an International Level? 
1 The SGS-decisions 
The decisions in SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philippines have sparked a heated 
academic debate, as these tribunals were the first to discuss the interpretation of umbrella 
clauses and their effect on contractual obligations in some depth. In addition, the two 
tribunals dealt with a very similar clause and set of facts but reached totally opposed 
conclusions. 
4 
(a) SGS v Pakistan 
In this case SGS, the dispute concerned a concession contract between the Swiss 
company SGS and Pakistan. SGS first sued in Swiss courts. As the contract provided 
local arbitration Pakistan subsequently initiated commercial arbitration before a Pakistani 
tribunal. While these proceedings were still pending, SGS brought the claim before an 
IC SID tribunal under the Swiss-Pakistani BfT. SGS alleged both a breach of the 
concession contract and a breach of the investment treaty, grounding the jurisdiction over 
the contract claims on Article 11 of the BIT which stated " Either contracting Party shall 
constantly guarantee the observance of commitments it has entered into with respect of 
the other Contracting Party" . The Tribunal examined the clause in the li ght of the 
ordinary meaning and the object and purpose of the treaty, concluding that it didn ' t have 
the effect of transforming contract violations into treaty breaches. 11 The Tribunal argued 
that the contracting parties could not have intended to give the clause the expansive scope 
attributed to it by SGS, and that the wording of the clause must be more explicit in order 
to allow such an assumption. 12 Furthermore, the Tribunal thought that a broad 
interpretation would invalidate all other substantive provisions in the BIT if simple 
contract breaches sufficed to bring a claim before ICSID. 13 
(b) SGS v Philippines 
In principle, the facts of this case are similar to SGS v Pakistan . SGS tried to 
invoke breach of contract, as well as breach of treaty claims, referring to Article X (2), 
the umbrella clause, in the Swiss-Philippines BIT. Here too the concess ion contract 
between SGS and the Philippines contained a forum selection clause providing 
jurisdiction for Philippine courts. The tribunal found that the object and purpose of the 
BIT required an interpretation which gave it the most effect, and with this approach 
interpreted the umbrella clause in a way favourable to forei gn investments and 
investors .14 Thus it concluded that the umbrella clause turned a breach of a contractual 
obligation on part of the State into a breach of the investment treaty, but it took care to 
11 SGS v Pakistan (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan), above n 5, 165 . 
12 
Ibid , para 170. 
13 Ibid , para 168 . 
14 SGS v Philippines (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Republic of the Philippines - on Objections 
to Jurisdiction)), above n 4, I 16, I 17. 
5 
stress that the contractual obligation in itself was still governed by domestic law.
15 
Regarding the exclusive jurisdiction clause, the Tribunal concluded that it was not 
overridden by the BIT, 16 and this could not be the case in general.
17 
The Tribunal made 
an exception to this rule in the case of extreme contractual breaches.
18 
2 The aftermath of the SGS-decisions 
The diametrically opposed approaches of the two tribunals mirror the divide 
amongst awards of ICSID tribunals and experts in the field of investment treaty 
arbitration faced with these issues . In the wake of the SGS-decisions IC SID tribunal tend 
to concur with either of the two awards. There is a strong tendency in favour of the 
interpretation of the umbrella clause expressed in SGS v Philippines. With regard to the 
overall purpose of providing a certain standard of protection to foreign investors 
providing them to reach a neutral forum to settle investment disputes it would be a step 
backwards to restrict the accessibility of ICSID tribunals in a way SGS v Pakistan does.
19 
However, where investment contracts contain an explicit forum selection clause and the 
breach of contract does not violate substantive standards of the BIT, it seems justified to 
hold the investor to the terms of the contract in order to comply with his part of the 
agreement, and in this case the protection of the host state ' s court or arbitration system 
should be sufficient.20 ln order to solve this dilemma, first and foremost the respective 
clause in the treaty and the parties ' intentions need to be examined carefully since maybe 
the parties have explicitly agreed on the effect of an umbrella clause. Unfortunately, such 
crystal clarity is a rare phenomenon in the field of investment arbitration, so tribunals will 
have to recur upon the means of treaty interpretation provided by international law, that is 
the textual interpretation of treaty provisions, taking into account object and purpose of a 
15 Ibid, para 128. 
16 Ibid , para 143. 
17 Ibid, para 153. 
18 Ibid , para 154. 
19 See also Thomas Waelde "The "Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" (2005) 6 J.W.I.T. 183 , 190. 
20 McLachlan/Shore/ Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: substantive principles, above n 6, 
4.112. 
6 
treaty.2 1 In recent case law there have been attempts to approach umbrella clauses from a 
different angle. These shall be discussed in the following. 
3 Only certain contracts covered? 
One approach to the question of whether contract claims fall within the protective 
umbrella is to ask whether the State is involved either in the contract itself or the breach 
of contract as a sovereign.22 If a state acts as a sovereign, making use of its administrative 
and executive power, this may trigger responsibilities on an international level. The idea 
to limit the application of the clause to cases were an "interference" of the state as a 
sovereign is a result of the need for an investor's protection against such state behaviour, 
as opposed to acts of the state as ''fisc" where domestic law systems and remedies 
provide sufficient protection.23 A similar mechanism is already practice in the field of EU 
jurisdiction, where protective provisions of the EC Treaty are not applied if a member 
state conduct equals that of an investor on the common market, so-called "market 
investor test" .24 The idea of the clause targeting sovereign state conduct runs like a red 
thread through the history of the emergence of umbrella clauses and shall briefly be 
described. For this reason, the original purpose of the clause needs to be distilled and 
adapted to the circumstances prevailing in investment treaty arbitration. 
(a) Historical background to the emergence of early observance of obligation clauses 
(i) The Lena Goldfields arbitration25 
The Lena Goldfields arbitration proceedings were conducted in 1930 and the case 
deserves to be mentioned in connection with the question of to what matters of a 
contractual relationship between a state and a foreign investor principles of international 
21 See also Christoph Schreuer "Travelling the BIT Route - Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and 
Forks in the Road, above n 4, 256 . 
22 Thomas Waelde "The " Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 196. 
23 Ibid , 197. 
24 Gabriela v.Wallenberg in Eberhard Grabitz/ Meinhard Hilf(eds) " Das Recht der Europaeischen Union" 
(loose leaf, C.H.Beck, Muenchen) Article 87 ECT, para 32 (last updated September 2004). 
25 For the full text of the award see Arthur Nussbaum "The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, LTD. 
and the Soviet Government" 36 Cornell LQ 31 , 42. 
7 
law may be applied. The case is as remarkable not only as it is the only arbitration in 
which the Soviet Union appeared as a party,26 but also as general principles of law were 
applied to a private claim, while domestic law was applied to other aspects of the 
· · 27 agreement m question. 
Lena Goldfields, Ltd. received an exploring, mining and transportation concession 
by the Soviet Government in 1925, while the Soviet Republic was living through the new 
economic policy-period (NEP), where small private businesses were allowed to operate 
within the Soviet Union in order to restore the weak Soviet economy. This policy was 
replaced by the so-called Five Year Plan in 1929, in the course of which the Soviet 
Government ' s attitude towards privately owned enterprises changed. Performances were 
withheld from Lena which prevented the company from complying with its obligations 
under the concession contract. In addition to that, a class war was waged against Lenas' 
employees who eventually resigned completely, and raids were conducted during which 
important documents on technical details were confiscated. As a result, Lena was forced 
to discontinue its activities in the Soviet Union and withdrew, after having invested a sum 
of £3,500,000 in the concessions. After an arbitration tribunal was established under the 
provisions of a separate arbitration agreement, the Soviet Union suddenly declared said 
arbitration agreement as "dissolved" and refused to be represented in the first session of 
the Tribunal. Nevertheless the proceedings could still be continued as the arbitration 
clause in the agreement provided for the arbitration to continue in such a situation.
28 
With regards to the claims brought forth by Lena Goldfield for unjust enrichment, 
Dr V.R. ldelson, legal counsel for Lena argued that the Tribunal should apply general 
principles of law such as those recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International justice at The Hague to the claim as "proper law" of the concession 
agreement. 29 On all the domestic matters and with regard to the performance of the 
26 Ibid, 31. 
27 V.V. Veeder "The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas" 47 lCLQ 747, 772. 
28 Arthur Nussbaum "The Arbitration between the Lena Gold fields, LTD. and the Soviet Government", 
above n 66 , 33. 
29 Ibid, 50 . 
8 
contract, the Jaw of the USSR should apply as the proper Jaw of the contract.30 To support 
this, it was argued that the 1925 concession agreement was signed amongst other 
members of the Russian Executive by the Commissary of Foreign affairs, and the fact 
that the Soviet Union had agreed to foreign private arbitration implied the application of 
international law. 31 This argumentation was eventually accepted by the Tribunal who thus 
applied general principles of law to the claim of unjust enrichment. As apparently the 
Soviet Civil Code did contain appropriate remedies for claims of unjust enrichment, the 
"splitting" of laws especially along this line has been contended and criticised.32 In 
principle, the Tribunal had to deal with the question of what law is applicable to a 
contract partially removed from domestic law and which law is applicable to determine 
whether such a contract has been violated by the state as a sovereign. An explanation can 
be found by taking a closer look at the legal nature of concession agreements under 
Soviet law, under which a concession agreement is removed to a certain extent from 
Soviet domestic law by virtue of approval of the Council of People's Commissionaires,33 
while at the same time constituting a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and 
the private investor.34 Because of this mixture of public and private law elements, the 
concession agreement could not be made to fit either under public of private law, hence 
the necessity to apply two "proper laws" and the necessity to recur upon general 
principles of law for want of applicability of the Soviet civil law code. 35 In effect, the 
Lena Tribunal internationalized part of a transnational contract, thus removing the part 
containing provisions for the protection of private investors from the grasp of Soviet 
domestic law, especially as Soviet municipal law in the given circumstances was prone to 
be altered to the disadvantage of Lena Goldfield. 
The approach of the Lena Tribunal may have paved the way for future Tribunals 
to remove certain agreements from the domestic law sphere into the international law 
sphere and thus creating not only state liability under international law but also 
30 Ibid . 
31 
V. V. Veeder "The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots o f Three Ideas", above n 28, 766 . 
32 Arthur Nussbaum "The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, LTD . and the Soviet Government", 
above n 66, 36. 
33 
V.V. Veeder "The Lena Goldfields Arbitration : The Historical Roots ofThree Ideas", above n 28, 760. 
34 Ibid, 771 . 
35 Ibid . 
9 
jurisdiction for Tribunals established outside the scope of national legal systems. Yet it 
seems that this approach could only be derived and justified from the peculiarities of the 
Soviet legal system, which allowed for such reasoning, a result which was not contended 
by the Soviet Government. 36 Although other legal systems did not feature such a 
distinction , the award was vitally important for the development of international 
commercial arbitration not only as a freestanding module of dispute settlement,
37 
but also 
for the application of international law to violations of contracts governed by domestic 
law. 
(ii) The nationalization of the Iranian oil industry 
The concept of internationalising contract claims arose in the early 1950s when 
concession contracts between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AlOC) and Iran were 
threatened by a policy advocating the nationalisation of the Iranian oil sector after a 
change of government.38 Since settlement of conflicts arising out of this process under 
municipal law would not prove to be successful, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht advised AIOC to 
include a clause in investment agreements that provided for the incorporation of the 
agreement into a treaty governed by international law,
39 creating the idea of a system of 
parallel protection. The objective behind this was to protect the agreement from unilateral 
changes in Iranian domestic law by withdrawing it from the latter, thus "stabilizing" the 
applicable law,40 supported by an inter-state remedy in case of a breach of the agreement. 
(iii) The Abs-Shawcross draft 
A further initiative to provide a greater protection for foreign investment was 
made by Dr Hermann Abs,41 who participated in the drafting of the 1959 International 
Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries 
(so-called "Abs-Draft"), later changed in cooperation with Sir Hartley Shawcross into the 
36 Ibid , 772. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Anthony C. Sinclair "The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment 
Protection" (2004) 20 Arb Int ' l 411, 414. 
39 Ibid , 4 I 5. 
40 Ibid . 
41 Chairman of the Deutsche Bank and Director of the Gemian Society to Advance the Protection of 
Foreign Investments . 
10 
combined Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad. This draft contained 
the following clause, Article II: 
"Each Party shall at all times ensure the observance of undertakings which it may have 
given in relation to investments made by nationals of any other Party. " 
This may be considered as the earliest version of the clause as no similar attempts 
had been made in other multinational drafts for the protection of foreign investors .42 The 
authors' intention was to protect contractual undertakings between states and foreign 
investors, which was also the interpretation of commentators at the time.43 The purpose 
of Article II was to extend the rule of pacta sun/ servanda to state contracts, thus bringing 
concession contracts under the protective umbrella.44 The Abs-Shawcross draft was never 
actually implemented, but did have a significant impact as a template for the next attempt 
to establish a multilateral framework for the protection of investments . 
(iv) The OECD Draft Convention45 
The I 962 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property included 
an observance of unde1iakings provision in Article 2, 
"Each Party shall at all times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in 
relation to property of nationals of any other party. " 
This provision was meant to have the effect of extending pacta sunt servanda to 
the property of nationals of another part/6, and the term " undertaking" in relation to 
42 
Anthony C. Sinclair " The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment 
Protection" above n 38,422. 
43 
Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors (1960) 9 J. Pub. L. 119, 120: Georg Schwarzenberger 
"The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary" (1060) 9 J. Pub. 
L. 147, 155 . 
44 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern "The Abs-Shawcross Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: 
Comments on the Round Table" ( 1961) I OJ . Pub. L. I 00, I 04. 
45 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property, Notes and Comments (1968) I lnt ' l Legal Materials 117, 123 . 
11 
property referring to a contract or in a concession" .
47 A limitation of this protection was 
envisaged by the drafters of the Convention insofar as there needs to be a certain link 
between the undertaking and the property concerned, meaning that it is not sufficient that 
said undertakings incidentally affect the protected property.
48 
Intended to serve as a 
model for member states for the drafting of their own investment treaties, the draft did 
not gain much support and was never implemented. 
(b) Analysis 
The historical background of the umbrella clause demonstrates that such clauses 
were drafted with regard to the protection of investors in an effort to avoid subjecting 
claims arising out of long-term investment agreements to the jurisdiction of domestic 
powers and instead to refer them to a system of protection under international law. The 
protection envisaged a protection of especially contractual claims arising out of 
concession contracts. Against the backdrop of the nationalization process of the Iranian 
oil industry, a period of time marked by instable governments and governmental conduct, 
a means to implement a certain amount of stability and predictability was needed. The 
type of state behaviour feared most in such long-term agreements were changes in 
domestic law unilaterally affecting such contracts and, ultimately, resulting in direct or 
indirect expropriation.49 The OECD Draft Convention pursues similar intentions, 
interestingly, the commentary connects a failure to observe undertakings with a failure to 
observe a party ' s constitutional law.so Although there is no explicit distinction between 
purely commercial contract disputes as opposed to dispute involving sovereign state 
behaviour, the draft focuses, as noted , sovereign state behaviour, considering the "giving 
of an undertaking" as a sovereign act and the breach of a right arising out of such an 
undertaking as a breach of international law.s
1 In conclusion, the drafters of early 
47 Ibid . 
48 Ibid , 124. 
49 Anthony C. Sinclair "The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment 
Protection" above n 38, 416; Thomas Waelde "The "U mbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A 
Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 20 I. 
50 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property, Notes and Comments, above n 45, 123 . 
51 Ibid , 123 . 
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umbrella clauses envisaged a system to stabilize long-term contracts and to provide 
investors with an international dispute remedy in order to establish effective justice. 
In the face of a significant change in the context of investment treaty arbitration 
since 1960, it is questionable if such an interpretation of the clause is still tenable. With 
the dramatic rise of BlTs during the 1990's,52 investor-state arbitration directly initiated 
by the foreign investor as opposed to state-initiated arbitration became frequent practice, 
giving investors an effective procedural tool for claiming the violation of their rights. 53 
This explains states ' interest to interpret the provisions of such treaties as narrowly as 
possible. Another aspect is that the wording of the clause has not changed significantly 
over the course of time, and an instrument that was formerly thought to protect long-term 
concession contracts now is included in the protection of treaties which operate with a 
notion of " investment" that is much wider in scope. 54 The early drafters of the clause 
possibly did not foresee the rapid development in BIT practice and the consequences for 
the applicability of the umbrella clause. In this regard, it is to be doubted that the early 
drafters of the clause intended it to have an extensive effect of covering all breaches of 
contract, regardless of whether the acts of the state are purely fiscal or involve a 
sovereign element. 
(c) Parallel structures in stabilization clauses? 
Stabilization or " freezing" clauses are included in investment agreements in order 
to prevent the host state from making subsequent changes in municipal law that 
negatively affect such agreements. 55 Stabilization clauses are used primarily in contracts 
of long duration , typically concession agreements between states and foreign investors. 56 
Such provisions are often included in contracts in order to protect them from unilateral 
acts of the state, such as changes in policy or law by which a state justifies non-
52 U CTAD Analysis of B!Ts, www.un ctadxi.org (last accessed 19.08 .2008). 
53 Thomas Waelde "The " Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original Intentions 
and Recent Cases" above n 19, 195 . 
54 Ibid, 205 . 
55 Thomas Waelde/George Ndi " Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law 
versus Contract Interpretation" ( 1996) 31 Tex. lnt'I. L. J. 215, 216. 
56 Georges R. Delaume Transnational Contracts - applicable law and selllement of disputes: a study in 
conflict avoidance (Oceana Publications , New York, 1975) 44 . 
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compliance with contractual obligations. In principle, such clauses represent the 
assurance of the state to the investor not to change domestic law affecting the contract. 
Stabilization clauses may appear in two slightly different forms. In the first alternative, 
the clause is designed to incorporate the law as it stands at the time of the constitution of 
the agreement as the proper law applicable to the contract.
57 
The second alternative 
contains a guarantee to the investor that legislation drafted subsequently to the contract 
will not be applied to the agreement. 58 As it is simply not sustainable to create a status 
qua which prevents the state from making reasonable adjustments to an agreement with a 
foreign investor, especially in a long term relationship which needs to weather the rapid , 
significant changes of (world) economy, the scope of the stabilising effect may be limited 
to certain areas only.59 For example, only the regulation of tariffs or exchange rates may 
be subjected to stabilisation,60 while other matters, such as politically charged or sensitive 
issues of law, may be excluded. Thus, certain areas of special relevance to the investment 
may be secured, but other areas of law remain subject to changes in the host states law, 
and, consequently, so does the investment contract. Umbrella clauses have often been 
likened to stabilization clauses as being their equivalent on an international level , only 
without the " freezing" function. 61 This is convincing as both types of provisions seek to 
ensure that a state complies with its contractual commitments and does not alter its laws 
so as to impede the investor 's contractual performance. In their basic intention to create a 
stable legal framework for the investor to operate in and to prevent states from "legally" 
ignoring their obligations under an investment agreement, stabilization clauses are very 
similar to observance of obligations clauses in investment treaties. Yet stabilization 
clauses are fraught with two basic problems, which tend to make them appear somewhat 
clumsy in their attempt to shield investments from changes in domestic law affecting 
them. Their intended function to "freeze" the law at the time of the investment seems 
rather artificial, and furthermore is quite a strong intrusion into the host state's 
57 Ibid , 45 . 
58 Ibid . 
59 Ibid, 47. 
6° Compare CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic(Award)), above n 9, para 61 
for an example of such a specific " freezing" effect. 
61 Thomas Waelde/George Ndi "Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law 
versus Contract Interpretation" ( 1996), above n 55, 2 I 6; McLachlan/Shore/ Weiniger International 
Investment Arbitration: substantive principles, above n 6, 4.1 14. 
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sovereignty, which is why the clause in this form is no longer very popular in investment 
agreements.62 Furthermore, even if stabilization clauses prohibit the host state to change 
the law regarding the contract, domestic law is applicable and the State is not restrained 
from altering the clause itself, which basically neutralizes the effect of the clause.63 And, 
as mentioned, it is simply unrealistic and unprofitable for both the state and the investor 
to create such an inflexible system of proper law that is not compatible with current 
economic developments. Umbrella clauses don't freeze the law so as to create "rigid" 
proper law. They do have the same intention though to create a certain stability and 
predictability regarding the legal framework under which an investment contract must 
operate, which is expressed in the requirement of states to observe their obligations, and 
in effect not to behave in a way that negatively affects the contractual agreement. As part 
of a treaty subject to international law, the clause is withdrawn from the grasp of the host 
state, so one could say that they fulfil! the function of stabilization clauses on an 
international level. The idea that only sovereign acts of the host state are covered by 
umbrella clauses stems from the notion of the parallelism of umbrella clauses and 
stabilization clauses, the latter only intending to operate in case of sovereign, not 
commercial acts. Furthermore, only sovereign states can give the guarantee not to alter 
their laws and thus not to exercise their most primordial function. 
An interesting approach towards the relation of stabilization clauses in contracts 
and umbrella clauses in treaties was developed by the Tribunal in the case of El Paso, 64 
which will be discussed below in more detail. The Tribunal rejected the applicability of 
an umbrella clause to contract claims unless the investment contract included additional 
protection that can only be granted by the state as a sovereign.65 Such additional 
protection is granted through a stabilization clause included in the contract. The effect of 
a stabilization clause in combination with an umbrella clause is described by the Tribunal 
in the CMS award, where the investment contract contained two stabilization clauses. 
62 Thomas Waelde/George Ndi " Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law 
versus Contract Interpretation" ( 1996), above n 55, 217. 
63 Ibid, 239. 
64 
El Paso (El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic - Decision on 
Jurisdiction (2006)), www.iisd.or:g (last accessed 17 July 2008). 
65 Ibid, 81 . 
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Both contained the obligation not to alter components of the basic legal framework 
directly affecting the contract, and certain measures adopted by Argentina did alter the 
said framework to the disadvantage of the foreign investor.
66 
With regards to Argentina's 
" interferences", the Tribunal emphasized the link between the stabilization and the 
umbrella clause. 
To ground the applicability of an umbrella clause to a contract on the existence of 
a provision in the contract that is granted through sovereign power seems to overstretch 
the idea that only sovereign acts of the state trigger its protective function. It is a difficult 
and delicate task for the investor to persuade the respective host State into agreeing to 
specially designed protective provisions in investment contract such as stabilization 
clauses.67 Host states might prove rather reluctant to consent, and especially since the 
Argentine financial crisis the appearance of stabilization clauses in contracts has 
declined .68 
Furthermore, it seems a little odd that an umbrella clause should have the sole 
function to protect yet another protective provision designed to immunize contracts from 
subsequent changes in law. It is apparent that clauses falling under domestic law may be 
preserved through international law in order not to fall victim to changes in the host 
state's domestic law themselves.69 But a violation of such a clause will in most cases be a 
breach of a substantive treaty standard like "fair and equitable treatment" by disregarding 
the investor's legitimate expectations, so that it is not necessary to recur upon umbrella 
clauses. For this reason, the requirement of the existence of a contractual protection 
granted by the state as a sovereign seems to be a bit off the mark in trying to solve the 
conflicts occurring in connection with umbrella clauses. What needs to be taken into 
account as well is that stabilization clauses tend to have much lower requirements 
regarding their violation to the point that less intrusive government behaviour may 
66 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Award)), above n 66, para 302. 
67 McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: substantive principles, above n 6, 
4.115. 
68 Lorenzo Cotula " Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development" (2008) 
OECD Global Forum on International Investment, 7. 
69 McLachlan/Shore/ Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: substantive principles, above n 6, 
4.1142. 
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already constitute a breach.70 This would in consequence lower the threshold for the 
initiation of treaty protection and might thus seriously affect the wi 11 ingness of states to 
make further commitments regarding the protection of foreign investors. 
What remains to be noted at this point is that the concept of stabilization clauses 
as well as their function is helpful in understanding the type of protection that umbrella 
clauses add to the system of investment protection. 
(d) ICSID case law 
The distinction between commercial and sovereign acts of the state can be found 
in numerous cases decided by Tribunals established under ICSID. 
(i) Joy Mining v Egypt71 
The dispute in Joy Mining concerned an investment contract between Joy Mining 
Machinery Limited and the General Organization for lndustrial and Mining Projects of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt ("IMC") over a phosphate mining project in Egypt. IMC 
withheld bank guarantees given by Joy Mining. The Tribunal drew a basic distinction 
between commercial aspects of a dispute and disputes involving some sort of "state 
interference". 72 The Tribunal doubted that purely contractual claims would get past the 
jurisdictional test of treaty-based tribunals , and it rejected its own jurisdiction on the basis 
that the bank guarantees in dispute were purely commercial aspects of the dispute. 73 
Since disputes about the releases of bank guarantees were of a common nature in such 
contracts, the fact that a state agency was involved did not change the nature of such 
disputes as purely commercial. 74 
70 
Lorenzo Cotula " Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development" , above n 68, 
9. 
1 1 Joy Mining (Joy Mining Machinery Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt (Decision on Jurisdicion)) 
(2004), available atwww.ita.law.uvic.ca (last accessed 15.09.2008). 
72 Ibid, para 72 . 
73 Ibid , para 78 . 
74 
Ibid , para 79 . 
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(ii) Impregilo v Pakistan
75 
Impregilo was the leader of a joint venture operating in Pakistan. In 1995, an 
investment contract was concluded between Impregilo on behalf of the joint venture, and 
the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (" WAPDA"), concerning the 
construction of a dam . Disputes arose when Impregilo alleged that the performance of the 
contract was impeded amongst other reasons through acts of the representative of 
WAPDA and WAPDA itself. Even though the Tribunal concluded that the contracts 
concluded between lmpregilo and WAPDA as sub-state entity were not covered by the 
relevant investment treaty because Pakistan could not be considered party to the 
contracts, further reasons were given for why the jurisdiction of the Tribunal did not exist 
in the first place. In order for a breach of contract to amount to a breach of the BIT, a 
state ' s behaviour must go "beyond that which an ordinary contracting party could 
adopt".76 This statement given more contour further on in the decision , where the 
Tribunal states that a "bad" performance of the contract does not automatically amount to 
a breach of treaty provision unless the state has gone "beyond its role as a mere party to 
the contract", exercising sovereign power.77 According to the Tribunal , this means for 
contractual claims that the investment treaty only applies where the host state has actually 
violated the investment treaty itself through his acts.
78 
(iii ) CMS v Argentina79 
In the course of the economic and financial crisis 1999-2000 in Argentina, the 
government passed emergency regulations that seriously affected foreign investments and 
investors in Argentina . One of the affected investors was CMS, a United States company 
operating in the gas sector through TNG, which CMS partly owned. CMS alleged that, 
through the alteration of contractual provisions based on the emergency regulations, 
Argentina failed to fulfill its contractual obligations. CMS based its claim on the 
15 fmpregilo (Jmpgregilo SpA v. Repllblic of Pakistan (Decision on JZ1risdiction)) (2005) 12 ICSID Reports 
242. 
76 Ibid , para 260 . 
77 Ibid , para 278 . 
78 Ibid , para 260 . 
79 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Repllblic (Award)), above n 66 . 
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operation of an umbrella clause in the Germany-Argentina BIT. Article I1(2)(c) of the 
BIT provided that each party 
"shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments. " 
In principle, the Tribunal did not object to the idea that contractual rights could be 
protected under the treaty, yet in the next sentence the Tribunal stressed that purely 
commercial claims may not be protected unless there was some significant government 
interference with the rights of the investor.80 
(iv) Noble Ventures v Romania81 
In Noble Ventures, the Claimant argued that an investment contract between the 
Claimant and the Romanian State Ownership Fund had been breached by the latter. 
The US-Romania BIT included in Article II(2)(c) a clause which required that "Each 
party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments", 
which the Claimant tried to invoke as an umbrella clause and alleged a violation of the 
Treaty. 82 The Tribunal first stated that Article ll(2)(c) of the Treaty had to be interpreted 
according to its ordinary meaning and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty, 
taking into consideration the effet utile of the clause. After applying these principles of 
interpretation to the clause in question , it found that without doubt the parties intended it 
to include obligations going beyond those of the other BIT provisions, thus also including 
obligations arising out of investment contracts. Otherwise, so the Tribunal, Article II(2)(c) 
would be deprived of any function. 83 In this context it is interesting to note that the 
Tribunal derived from the wording "any obligation entered into .. . " that specific 
commitments were addressed, not only general commitments, for example in the form of 
legislative acts.84 Turning to a more general evaluation of the clause, the Tribunal held 
80 Ibid, para 299. 
81 Noble Ventures (Noble Ventures Inc v Romania (Award))(2005) Case o. ARB/0 I/ I I, available at 
www.ita. law.uvic.ca (last accessed 15.09.2008). 
82 Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Romania 
concerning the reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, available at www.unctadxi.Qig 
(last accessed 15 .09.2008). 
83 Noble Ventures (Noble Ventures Inc v Romania (Award)), above n 81, para 51. 
84 Ibid . 
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that umbrella clauses in BITs dissolve the general distinction between obligations of 
states under domestic and international law, and that thus a restrictive interpretation is 
appropriate. Regarding the concept of state responsibility and the Respondent ' s argument 
that only governmental conduct was attributable, the Tribunal stated that it did not give 
this distinction much weight, since it considered it difficult to distinguish governmental 
from non-governmental conduct. It supported this conclusion with the inclusion of such a 
distinction in the lLC draft work on international responsibility, which should 
demonstrate that the distinction needed codification in order to be recognized.
85 The 
Tribunal concluded, that, although in international law a breach of contract is not 
automatically a breach of international law, by virtue of an umbrella clause, breaches of 
contract may constitute breaches of treaty where a certain act is attributable to the state in 
any way. 86 
(v) El Paso v Argentina
87 
El Paso, a US company, claimed that the emergency measures adopted by 
Argentina in view of the economic crisis negatively affected their undertakings in 
Argentina. The Tribunal had to decide whether these measures amounted to a failure to 
perform the concession contracts with El Paso and if so, if a breach of these contracts in 
turn violated the investment treaty.
88 ln order to do this, the Tribunal thought it necessary 
to adopt a "balanced" interpretation, weighing state sovereignty and state responsibility to 
create and maintain and environment favourable for foreign investment.
89 Following the 
line of interpretation set out in SGS v Pakistan , the Tribunal came to the conclusion that 
umbrella clauses do not have the effect of transforming contract into treaty claims, unless 
this intention was expressed "clearly and unambiguously"
90 by the parties to the treaty. 
Only if an act violated both the investment contract and the standards of protection of the 
investment treaty could contract claims amount to treaty claims. In order to determine 
when this was the case, the Tribunal considered the distinction between the state as a 
85 Ibid , para 82 . 
86 Ibid , para 85. 
87 El Paso (El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic - Decis/011 011 
Jurisdiction (2006)), www.ii s_d.or 0 (last accessed 17 July 2008). 
88 Ibid, para 67. 
89 Ibid, para 70. 
90 Ibid, para 74. 
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sovereign and the State as a merchant as highly relevant. 91 Referring to the decision in 
Joy Mining v Egypt, 92 which distinguished between purely commercial aspects and State 
interference with the contract in dispute, the tribunal further relied on Article VI I (I) of 
the Argentine-US BIT. According to the tribunal, this provision defined an "investment 
dispute" under the BIT as a dispute that arises between the investor and the State as a 
sovereign. 93 From this the tribunal concluded that the umbrella clause in the Argentine-
US BIT did not cover purely commercial contracts, yet such provisions in investment 
contracts were covered that give special protection to foreign investments and that were 
granted by the state as a sovereign. 94 As an example the tribunal referred to a stabilization 
clause in the contract, which is usually intended to "freeze" the law at the time of the 
investment, making the investment immune to subsequent changes in domestic law. 95 
(e) Analysis 
A significant body oflCSID Tribunals developed and emphasized an 
interpretation of the umbrella clause that is very much in line with its origins in the brief 
history of investment arbitration. The origins of the clause as a measure to protect foreign 
investors from sovereign acts amounting to expropriation in turn supports these 
Tribunals' application of the clause only where there is a sovereign element in the 
behaviour of the state. On the other hand, the arguments brought forth by the Tribunal in 
Noble Ventures stating that the distinction between purely commercial and sovereign act 
in order to attribute a certain behaviour to the state is not very meaningful, is somewhat 
compelling. Is the distinction between commercial and sovereign acts of the state a 
distinction that helps to attribute state responsibility to either the national or the 
international level? Usually, these criteria are implemented within the concept of 
restrictive immunity to determine whether a state is granted immunity for its or its 
91 Ibid, para 81. 
92 Joy Mining v Egypt (Joy Mining Machine,y limited and the Arab Republic of Egypt - Award on 
Jurisdiction (2004)), www.asil.org (last accessed 17 July 2008), para 72. 
93 El Paso (El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic-Decision on 
Jurisdiction (2006)) , above n 23, para 81. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Thomas Waelde "The "Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 200. 
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entities' actions.96 In principle, these two directions of interpretation stem from the debate 
regarding the meaning of the term "state" in national and international law and the 
intercommunication between the international and the domestic legal order.
97 
Which 
"state" is party to a contract with a private investor and how is this "state" liable? 
According to the dualist theory, the state acting under international law different to the 
state acting under national law, in other words, the legal personality of the state differs 
with the law applied to its acts. 98 As, traditionally, international law is purely interstate 
law,99 then how can a state with acting as a subject of private law be responsible under 
international law? 
The approach followed by most Tribunals when faced with the interpretation of 
the observance of obligation clause has been favouring the dualist approach. According 
to this approach the term "state" has different meanings in international and domestic law. 
In domestic law, the state can both act as a sovereign as well as a private party whereas in 
international law a state is only able to act as a sovereign contracting party. Thus a state 
acting as a private party can not be liable for breaches of international law. 
100 
Jn order for 
the state to be held liable under a treaty for acts violating a domestic law contract, there 
needs to be some sort of link between the two legal orders. This implies that the state 
behaviour does not only violate the contract but also treaty obligations. The function of 
an umbrella clause under this interpretation would only be relevant for the "domestic law 
state", equating its liability with that of the "international law state". This is correct 
insofar as international law may be allocated to the field of pub! ic law, where forms of 
private or purely commercial law do not appear. On the other hand, with the growing 
power and influence of transnational corporations on a global level, private entities may 
be subjects to international law to a certain extent. Under contemporary international law, 
96 Dhisadee Chamlongrasdr " Defining a State for the Purposes of Immunity and Liability of a State and its 
Entities" 16 European Business Law Review 1287, 1291. 
97 Bjorn Kunoy "Si nging in the Rain - Developments in the Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses", above n 
4, 291. 
98 Charles Leben Con/rat d 'Etat et droit international des investissements, (2003) Recueil des Courts de I' 
Academic de Droit International de la Haye, 202, 322. 
99 Ibid, 320. 
'
00 Bjorn Kunoy "Singing in the Rain - Developments in the Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses", above n 
4, 291. 
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individuals may be subjects of international law to a certain extent. With the emergence 
of investor-state arbitration under ICS!D, diplomatic protection of foreign individual 
through states has lost significance in the field of investment. These are developments 
which the dualist theory fails to explain, 10 1 as here only states as the creators of 
international law are also its subjects. 
The dualist approach is contested by the so-called "monist approach" 102 , which 
knows only a unilateral "state" and therefore, under this approach it is doubted that a 
distinction between sovereign and commercial acts with respect to the attribution of 
responsibility is of any significance. 103 By stating that the umbrella clause constitutes an 
exception to the concept of separation between municipal and international law, the 
Noble Ventures Tribunal supported this line of argumentation. Although the monist 
approach opposes the idea of a state with a "split personality", it does embody the notion 
of a two-dimensional personality of the state: municipal and international , 104 and the 
distinction between sovereign and commercial acts only serves to differ between these 
spheres regarding the legal nature of the act. 105 According to this approach, if a state is 
generally liable for its acts, no matter whether sovereign or commercial, then an umbrella 
clause would have the effect of invoking the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal in every 
case of a breach of contract, regardless of whether a sovereign act is involved, thus 
having a very broad scope. It seems that the Tribunal in Noble Ventures still shied away 
from explicitly voicing this conclusion by requiring a restrictive interpretation of the 
clause. 
The meaning given to the umbrella clause under the monist approach is 
considerably wider than the one under the dualist approach, since the latter excludes 
certain areas of state operations from its scope. Yet it seems strange that under the monist 
approach, the nature of the state as a contracting partner under domestic law is turned into 
101 Charles Leben Contra/ d 'Etat et droit international des investissements, above n 99, 302, 323. 
102 Ibid, 294; see Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1946)377, 
103 Charles Leben Contra! d'Etat et droit international des investissements, above n 99, 330. 
104 Hans Kelsen General Theo,y of law and State, above n I 02, 3 77. 
105 Charles Leben Contra/ d'Etat et droit international des investissements, above n 99, 330. 
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a contracting partner under international law. As the Committee in the CMS Decision on 
Annulment pointed out, if the content and the proper law of an obligation are not 
transformed into something else by virtue of the umbrella clause, neither are the parties to 
the obligation. 106 It may be true that the dualist approach has difficulties with the 
inclusion of private persons as subjects of international law, but the question at the root of 
the discussion that needs to be solved is what effect the umbrella clause has on claims 
arising under domestic law, not if foreign investors can be treated as a subject of 
international law. This implies that any form of international responsibility can only be 
conferred on a state that is acting as a sovereign contracting party. For this reason, the 
distinction between acts of the state as sovereign of as a merchant remains significant for 
the question of whether an umbrella clause has the effect of conferring jurisdiction upon 
an ICSID tribunal in a specific case. Furthermore, such an interpretation is in line with 
the ideas of the first drafters, who envisaged the clause as a safeguard against inconsistent 
state behaviour. The protection of foreign investors is much more advanced now than at 
the time of the emergence of the clause, and investors may directly initiate arbitral 
proceedings with states, so there is no reason to give the clause an even wider scope and 
to include purely commercial claims. 
In principle, to attribute to umbrella clauses a function similar to stabilization 
clauses in order to prevent states to legalize their contractual breaches would complete 
the protective framework set up under investment treaties, and would support the 
requirement of having a sovereign state act in order to invoke BIT protection under an 
umbrella clause. 
107 In other words, an umbrella clause will only convert breaches of 
contract into breaches of treaty if there is a sovereign element in an otherwise purely 
commercial contract, either through the existence of a protective provision granted by the 
state as a sovereign or through a breach of contract induced by the state as a sovereign. 
What remains to be discussed is whether thus umbrella clauses, by targeting sovereign 
acts of a state in violation of a contract, restrain the host state from making any changes 
in domestic investment law that negatively affect the contractual framework. This must 
106 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)) above n 9, 
para 9S(c). 
107 Ibid. 
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be answered in the negative as this would place the effect of umbrella clauses on host 
state law too close to the undesirable " freezing" effect of stabilization clauses. It cannot 
be reasonably suggested that through a provision in an investment treaty a state waives 
the right to adapt its investment laws to the rapidly fluctuating (world) economy. What is 
certain is that the state behaviour must display the "colour of government" . 108 If that is 
the case, it must be determined whether said behaviour is legitimate, whether it is a 
general and non-discriminatory measure that does not specifically aim at the investor 
with the intention of escaping contractual obligations. 109 If a state abuses its 
governmental powers by inflicting arbitrary and discriminatory measures upon the 
foreign investor or the investment, thus preventing the investor from the performance of 
obligations under the contract or creating a legal framework that renders the contractual 
agreement completely useless, then the umbrella clause has the effect of 
"internationalizing" State responsibility and invoking the protection of the investment 
treaty. 
This interpretation of the clause comes to terms with the dilemma described above. 
The foreign investment is protected from violation through sovereign acts against which 
there rarely is an effective domestic remedy. At the same time, if the states acts merely as 
any merchant would , then the remedies negotiated in the investment contract must suffice. 
What does remain a concern in this respect is the question of how to exactly determine 
when a state has used or abused sovereign power. This might prove a difficult task for the 
investor, especially with a view to the burden of proof, since it might be a daunting task 
for the investor to provide proof of an abusive use of a state ' s sovereign power. In order 
to determine this, Tribunals could refer to the criteria developed in Joy Mining and 
Impreglio , according to which there needs to be a state " interference" in such a way that 
the state behaves beyond that of what a normal , private investor would be capable of. 
A distinction between breaches of contract and breaches of treaty needs to be 
maintained when considering the effects of umbrella clauses. Purely contractual claims, 
108 Thomas Waelde "The " Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 197. 
109 Ibid, 198 . 
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or purely commercial contracts remain subject to domestic law, as here the parties' 
intention must prevail. Only when the parties' contractual agreement is overridden by 
sovereign acts of the state, or when the contract in itself is concluded between an investor 
and a state as a sovereign, the protective purpose and function of B lTs under international 
law may be activated by recurring upon an umbrella clause. 
C Exclusive Contractual Jurisdiction Clauses v Treaty Remedies 
Conflicts may also arise related to the simultaneous existence of an umbrella 
clause in an investment treaty and an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the investment 
contract, referring contractual disputes to domestic courts or commercial arbitration. 
Once the question is decided on whether an ICSID tribunal has jurisdiction over the claim 
brought to ICSID by virtue of an umbrella clause in the affirmative, there are two 
competing jurisdictions. Which one should be given priority? 
1 Treaty claims 
It is commonly recognized that contractual forum selection clauses do not deprive 
a treaty-based tribunal of its jurisdiction over treaty-based claims, as these are governed 
by international law and therefore fall within the jurisdiction of the international 
forum. 11 0 
2 Contract claims 
In this context, problematic are the so-called "overlapping" claims that constitute 
both a breach of the investment treaty by virtue of the umbrella clause as well as a breach 
of the investment contract. 
110 John P. Gaffney/James L. Loftis "The "Effective Ordinary Meaning" of BITs and the Jurisdiction of 
Treaty-Based Tribunals to hear Contract Claims" (2007) 8 J.W.I.T. 5, 28 . 
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(a) JCSID case Law 
(i) Vivendi 111 
In the Vivendi case, the Claimant, a foreign investor operating in Argentina, 
alleged the termination of a long-term concession contract concluded with the province of 
Tucuman through various acts of Argentina. The concession contract in question 
contained a forum selection clause in favour of local proceedings. The Tribunal held that 
such a forum selection clause in the contract could not exclude the jurisdiction of ICSJD 
tribunals over treaty claims. 11 2 The Tribunal then went on to distinguish alleged 
violations of the BIT from claims arising out the concession contract with the province. It 
held that claims essentially based on a breach of contract, and thus do not giving rise to 
treaty violations, needed to be referred to the respective forum in the contractual forum 
selection clause. 11 3 The Tribunal concluded that, by virtue of the contractual forum 
selection clause, it did not have jurisdiction over such claims and thus its ' otherwise 
given jurisdiction under the BIT did not preclude the jurisdiction of local courts. 114 Only 
in the case of the denial of substantive juridical rights could the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal be asserted in connection with contractual claims. 115 
The award became subject to annulment proceedings in 2002. 11 6 In principle, the 
Committee agreed with the Tribunal in view of its decision that it had jurisdiction over 
treaty claims even in the face of the existence of a contractual jurisdiction clause. Yet the 
Committee held that the Tribunal hat manifestly exceeded its powers by not exercising 
its' (in the Committees' opinion given) jurisdiction over the treaty claims arising out of 
the investment contract with the province. 11 7 The Committee further stressed that, if a 
breach of international law was involved, the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is 
111 Vivendi (Compania de Aguas de! Aconquija SA. and Vivendi Universal SA. v the Argentine Republic 
(Award)) (2000) 5 ICSID Reports 296. 
112 Vivendi (Compania de Aguas de[ Aconquija SA. and Vivendi Universal SA. v the Argentine Republic 
(Award)), above n I 12, para 53. 
113 Ibid, para 77. 
114 Ibid, para 79 . 
115 Ibid, para 80 . 
116 Vivendi (Compania de Aguas de/ Aconquija SA. and Vivendi Universal SA. v the Argentine 
Republic(A nnulment) (2002) 6 ICSID Reports 340 . 
117 Ibid , para I I I . 
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not dispositive and does not preclude a tribunal from considering the merits of the 
dispute.' 18 It is noteworthy that the Committee strictly distinguished between the legal 
groundings of the claims. In case of the contractual claims, the Committee expressly 
criticized the Tribunal for not deciding on the question of whether they constituted a 
breach of the BIT, strictly separating the legal bases of the claim.
11 9 
Thus it avoided the 
question of what to do in a situation in which a contractual breach constituted a breach of 
treaty at the same time, and a tribunal needed to refer to the merits of the claim which are 
governed by domestic law, thus falling under the jurisdiction of municipal courts as 
well.1 20 
(ii) Aguas de! Tunari 121 
Aguas del Tunari, a locally incorporated company acting on behalf of a foreign 
investment consortium concluded a concession contract with Bolivia. The contract 
contained an exclusive forum selection clause providing for dispute settlement by local 
Bolivian courts. The concession was terminated early in 2000 due to violent public 
opposition, and Aguas del Tunari alleged that it would have been Bolivia' s duty under 
the concession contract to respond in order to secure the performance of the contract. 
122 
Bolivia claimed that there was the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute 
because the dispute settlement clause in the concession contract precluded ICSID 
jurisdiction. The Tribunal held that a jurisdiction clause in the contract will not exclude 
ICSID jurisdiction unless it is clear and unequivocal that the parties intended to waive its 
jurisdiction.123 Furthermore, the Tribunal stressed that the agreement to an investment 
contract containing an exclusive forum selection clause does not amount to an implied 
waiver of the right to bring a claim before !CSID. 124 The Tribunal set out a number of 
threshold requirements in order for a forum selection clause to be applicable over the 
118 Ibid , para 113. 
119 Ibid , para I 11 . 
120 See also Michael Pauli " ICSID : The Relationship Between Foreign Investment Protection Dispute 
Settlement and Contractual Claims (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2004) 23. 
1~1 Aguas de/ Tunari (Aguas de! Tunari, SA . v. Republic of Bolivia(Award)) (2006) 18 World Trade and 
Arbitration Materials 271. 
122 Ibid , para 73. 
123 Ibid , para 119. 
124 Ibid, para 120. 
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jurisdiction of a treaty-based tribunal. Firstly, the investment contract should involve the 
same parties, secondly deal with the same matters and thirdly, contain mandatory 
conflicting obligations. 125 If these threshold requirements were fulfilled, only an explicit 
waiver of the investor's entitlement to ICSID arbitration to hear contract claims could 
give a contractual forum selection clause the effect of precluding the former. 126 
(iii) The SGS cases 
In both SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philippines, the Tribunals had to deal with the 
question of whether contractual jurisdiction clauses had the effect of precluding their 
jurisdiction under ICSID. In SGS v Pakistan, the Tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction 
over SGS' claims despite the existence of the forum selection clause, if they weren't of a 
purely contractual nature. The argument was that, due to the fact that the BIT between 
Switzerland and Pakistan was signed a year later than the investment contract between 
SGS and Pakistan, it could not have been the parties' intention to conduct local 
arbitration over BIT claims. 127 Regarding claims arising out of the investment agreement, 
which, according to the Tribunal, were not encompassed by the umbrella clause, the 
Tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction. 128 The Tribunal in SGS v Philippines 
found that an umbrella clause in the BIT did not have the effect of overriding the 
contractual forum selection clause regarding the pursuit of contractual claims. The 
Tribunal argued with !ex specialis derogat !ex generali, stating that general BIT 
provisions could not preclude special agreements in investment contracts. Secondly, the 
Tribunal argued that the protection of the BIT is meant to support, not supplant 
specifically negotiated investment conditions agreed on by the parties. 129 Rather, in case 
of competing jurisdictions, the contractual provision should be given priority, and only if 
domestic remedies fail the treaty-based tribunals jurisdiction should be taken up again. 13 0 
According to the tribunal, these situations are not strictly a question of jurisdiction but of 
125 Ibid, para 111 . 
126 Ibid, para 119. 
127 SGS v Pakistan (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction)), above n 5, para 153. 
128 Ibid, para 162. 
129 SGS v Philippines (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Republic of the Philippines 
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction)) above n 5, para 142. 
130 Ibid, para155 . 
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the admissibility of a claim to a treaty-based tribunal. In any way, an investor could not 
claim a breach of contract but then depart from the contractual agreement in order to 
enforce that very same contract.
131 
Antonio Crivellaro, one of the members of the Tribunal, did not agree with this 
conclusion and submitted a dissenting opinion.
132 In Crivellaro's opinion, the BIT 
between Switzerland and Pakistan offered an investor an "unconditional right"
133 
to 
submit a dispute to either domestic or international arbitration. He argues that the most 
significant advantage of a BIT is to grant the investor the right to select the dispute 
settlement forum provided in the BIT that seems to be most convenient.
134 
He 
characterized as a special asset of the BIT in question that the choice of the respective 
dispute settlement forum could be chosen by the investor after the dispute had arisen, and 
without such an option the practical significance of BITs would diminish.
135 
Furthermore 
he contended the applicability of the !ex specialis rule could be applied to both treaty and 
contract, as they were not of the same legal nature and didn't bind the same parties. 
136 
Finally, he asserted that Article Vlll(2) of the Swiss-Pakistani BIT
137 
granted the investor 
more favourable treatment regarding dispute settlement in the sense that the right to 
choose a forum was created after SGS already accepted local jurisdiction. He argued that 
this choice was not irrevocable, since the principle of law stating that a provision giving 
an advantage to a certain party could be given several meaning, the most favourable 
should be retained should apply. 
138 
13 1 lbid, paral54. 
132 Antonio Crivellaro SGS v Philippines (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Republic of the 
Philippines (Declaration)) 8 ICSID Reports 568. 
133 Ibid , para 3. 
134 Ibid, para 5. 
135 Ibid , para 6. 
136 Ibid , para 9. 
137 Accord entre la ConredSration suisset la RSpublique islamique du Pakistan concernant la promotion et la 
protection rSciproque des investissiments, available at www.unctadxi .org (last accessed 15.09.2008). 
138 Antonio Crivellaro SGS v Philippines (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Republic of the 
Philippines (Declaration)) above n 132, para I 0. 
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(b) Analysis 
ICSID jurisprudence seems to be fairly steady on the issue in question. The 
Tribunal in SGS v Phillippines specified the notion already denoted in Aguas de! Tunari 
and Vivendi, that if there are overlapping claims, there are two jurisdictions which do not 
exclude each other but which are only applicable in a certain order or under certain terms. 
The Tribunal in Aguas de! Tunari even demanded an explicit of unequivocally implicit 
waiver of the right to arbitrate before an international tribunal. Finally, the Tribunal in 
SGS v Philippines even dismissed the issue as a problem of admissibility rather than 
jurisdiction. 
In this context, it has been contested that there is no real competition between 
jurisdictions at all. Reinisch argued that an umbrella clause applied to a contract claim 
gives rise to two different jurisdictions. 139 Reinisch reckons that the emergence of a BIT 
claim under lCSID jurisdiction does not annul the underlying contract claim, thus he 
basically asserts that the existence of an umbrella clause creates two parallel jurisdictions, 
one for the treaty claim and one for the contract claim. 140 It is true that the nature of a 
claim is not changed by virtue of an umbrella clause, and that there are two separate legal 
bases. But according to this reasoning, there would be two parallel proceedings, both 
potentially dealing with the merits of the dispute. The danger of the inconsistency of the 
awards is evident. 
The reasoning presented in SGS v Philippines has certain advantages. A domestic 
court or arbitration tribunal might be more effective in solving a contractual dispute 
governed by domestic Jaw. Nonetheless the accessibility to the treaty-based tribunal is 
not waived (unless an express waiver exists), but suspended. Yet this approach can not be 
accepted without criticism. For one thing, the Jack of clarity regarding the re-initiation of 
the ICSID tribunal's proceedings is critically mentioned. 141 Crivellaro pointed out that 
this could be the situation in case of a denial of justice or other severe procedural 
139 August Reinisch "Umbrella Clauses" (2006 Seminar on Investment Protection, Vienna, 12 September 
2006), 29. 
140 Ibid. 
14 1 Thomas Waelde "The "Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 230. 
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grievances. 14
2 He touches upon another drawback for the investor regarding the 
judgement on the merits. ICSID tribunals are not meant to be a supplementary court of 
appeal and thus, in the above-mentioned case of reinitiating ICSJD proceedings, could 
not render a judgement on the merits.
143 Furthermore, giving a contractual forum 
selection clause priority would deprive an umbrella clause of its function and purpose to 
add extra protection of foreign investments by "forcing" the investor to first initiate 
proceedings before domestic courts.
144 
Yet this argument is not convincing as access to a treaty-based tribunal is not 
blocked but merely suspended. lt can be required of the investor first to live up to his part 
of a deal before bringing a contract claim before a treaty tribunal. Crivellaro's argument 
regarding the most favourable treatment of the investor in context with Article Vlll(2) of 
the Swiss-Philippines BIT does not seem convincing as this would open the door for 
"forum shopping" on part of the investor, as probably every investor would rather select 
ICSID over local arbitration. This would deprive the contractual forum selection clause 
of any meaning and might even prevent countries from concluding BJTs for fear of 
invalidating such clauses in all investment contracts.
145 Also, it is not quite clear to the 
author how a principle of law such as the " more favourable treatment" rule drawn on by 
Crivellaro should apply to two agreements based on totally different sources of law. It 
seems contradictory to the criticism applied before with regards to the lex specialis rule. 
While there are compelling reasons supporting the prior reference of the investor 
to the juridical remedies spelt out in the investment contract, there are cases in which 
ICSID jurisdiction should prevail. In situations where there is an evident misuse of 
governmental power the investor be allowed should to directly refer to an ICSID tribunal. 
This is , for example, the case in which the state party to a contract thwarts the 
142 Antonio Crivellaro SGS v Philippines (SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance v. Republic of the 
Philippines (Declaration)) above n 132, para 12 . 
143 Ibid, para 12 . 
144 Ibid . 
145 
Compare Michael Pauli " ICS!D: The Relationship Between Foreign Investment Protection
 Dispute 
Settlement and Contractual Claims", above n 120, 43. 
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enforcement of an award by a domestic court rendered in favour of the investor. 146 This 
idea is supported by the finding of the Tribunal in Vivendi, which held that prior recourse 
to IC SID would only be allowed in the case of denial of procedural justice or denial of 
substantive justice. 147 In such a case, the investor has fully exhausted local remedies and 
there is no denial of justice. The umbrella clause would have the relevance of an 
independent, substantive treaty standard, as one could see the preceding breach of 
contract as "amended" through the domestic court ' s award , but the realization of justice 
is prevented through sovereign acts of the state. 
The same effect could take place in the case of a change in municipal law that 
completely frustrates the investment contract 148 At first glance, this might seem arguable, 
as the maintenance of a predictable and stable legal framework is already protected , with 
regard to the investors ' legitimate expectations, by the requirement to accord fair and 
equitable treatment to foreign investments. The difficulty of giving the umbrella clause 
an independent, free-standing meaning is illustrated in the CMS Award , where the 
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the " fair and equitable treatment" standard in the 
BIT had been breached, depriving the subsequent considerations regarding the violation 
of the umbrella clause of practical significance. 149 Yet there are a few leads in the 
Tribunal's reasoning that might help to draw the fine line between the situations in which 
a change in municipal law concerns the "fair and equitable treatment" standard, and when 
the umbrella clause might potentially be affected. The Tribunal derived from the BIT' s 
preamble that a "stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and 
equitable treatment". 150 The Tribunal grounded its findings on the fact that the legal 
framework guaranteed to the investor regarding the tariff regime in connection with the 
dollar standard was basically abolished , and thus the investment crucially affected. 151 
146 McLachlan/ Shore/Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: substantive principles, above n 6, 
4.157. 
147 Vivendi (Compania de Aguas de/ Aconquija SA. and Vivendi Universal SA. v the Argentine Republic 
(Award)), above n 111 , para 80 . 
148 McLachlan/ Shore/Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: substantive principles, above n 6, 
4.157. 
149 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Award)), above n 66, para 303 . 
150 Ibid, para 274. 
151 Ibid, para 275. 
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Referring to the stabilization clauses, the Tribunal pointed out that not the fact that the 
law was not "frozen" amounted to a breach of "fair and equitable", as it "can always 
evolve and be adapted to changing circumstances" .
152 
Rather, it argued that foreign 
investment protection was designed to avoid the situation that a legal framework is 
dispensed as a whole when contrary commitments have been made to investors. With a 
view to the function of an umbrella clause to protect the commitments made to an 
investor with regard to a specific contract or a specific investment, it seems that the line 
regarding the application of either standard needs to be drawn where there is a change in 
municipal law that potentially affects foreign investment on a wide scale, or just a 
contractual framework as such. This result is supported by a remark made by the 
Committee in the decision on dnnulment, stating that the obligations covered by the 
umbrella clause are " specific obligations concerning the investment. They do not cover 
general requirements imposed by the law of the host State."
153 In effect, an umbrella 
clause could only obtain freestanding relevance if the change in municipal law as a 
consequence invalidates or severely impairs the contract and thus negatively impacts on 
the specific foreign investment as such. Such an interpretation would allow the umbrella 
clause to operate independently and would live up to its function as a protective standard 
for a specific undertaking. There is one point of concern, though. In practice, it is will be 
very difficult to draw this fine boundary between acts affecting the contract and acts 
affecting investments comprehensively. This is demonstrated by the interpretation the 
Tribunal in CMS attributed to the stabilization clauses in the concession contracts. The 
Tribunal recognized the rise of individual rights out of the stabilization clauses which 
could be invoked by the investor. 154 As these clauses promise the preservation of a whole 
legal framework, any alteration to the point of abolishment constitutes a breach of fair 
and equitable treatment, according to the Tribunals reasoning. As noted by Kunoy, 
155 
it 
would have been more fruitful for the analysis of umbrella clauses in relation to "fair and 
152 Ibid , para 277. 
153 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)), above n 9, 
para 95 (a). 
154 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic(Award)), above n 66 , para 151 . 
155 Bj orn Kunoy " Singing in the Rain - Developments in the Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses", above n 
4, 299. 
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equitable treatment" had the Tribunal in regarded the stabilization clauses as a general 
guarantee for investors as such. 
Overall , if both contract and treaty remedies are applicable to a contractual claim, 
a valid contractual forum selection clause should not be overridden by the jurisdiction of 
a treaty tribunal obtained through an umbrella clause. Tribunals should require the 
observance of contractual obligations of both parties to the respective contract in order to 
prevent a complete invalidation of a legally valid contractual provision that the foreign 
investor has explicitly agreed to . Only in case of an abuse of sovereign power that 
frustrates the effectiveness and the function of domestic courts should the investor be 
allowed to recur upon a treaty-based tribunal via the umbrella clause in the respective 
BIT in order not to be denied justice. 
D Left Standing in the Rain: What about the Subsidiaries? 
I Introduction 
It is common practice in the field of international investment that investors 
operate through locally incorporated subsidies or have contractual a contractual 
relationship not directly with a state, but with a sub-state entity. This may cause some 
problems when it comes to the operation of an umbrella clause. Recent decisions of 
IC SID tribunals have given rise to the question of whether contractual relationships 
between a foreign investor and a sub-state entity or between a state and a local subsidiary 
of a foreign investor fall within the protective scope of an umbrella clause. 
2 Outlining the problem 
Once the question of whether a contractual dispute falls within the scope of an 
umbrella clause at all has been clarified , the further question remains of whether the 
contract is concluded by parties who are adressees of the umbrella clause. This might be 
difficult to determine if the foreign investor does not operate directly within the host 
state ' s premises, but through locally incorporated subsidies. ls this still a " foreign 
investment" and is thus a breach of contract concluded with such a subsidy still a 
35 
violation of an umbrella clause? If a state does not directly conclude a contract with the 
foreign investor but through a wholly or largely state-owned sub-entity, is this still a 
contract between the host state and the investor? These questions are highly relevant 
since especially large transnational corporations operate through subsidiary corporations, 
which poses several advantages, for example the distribution of risk and flexibility in a 
global market. 156 As usual , there is no common direction within ICSlD jurisprudence 
regarding this issue, ICSID case law demonstrates that tribunals may decide either way. 
The tribunals in Axurix 157 and and Siemen/58 rejected contractual claims from a foreign 
investor' s subsidiary, while the tribunals in CMS,
159 Enron
160 
and Sempra
161 
held that a 
breach of contract concluded between a state and an investor ' s subsidiary was a violation 
of the respective umbrella clause. 
3 JCSID jurisprudence on local subsidiary corporations 
A similar feature in the cases at hand was the operation of foreign companies 
through local subsidiaries because either it was required by the bidding terms and 
conditions in order to obtain a license 162 or the local corporations already owned licenses 
with convenient provisions for foreign investors. 
163 Furthermore, Argentina had 
established a network of bilateral investment treaties ensuring investment-friendly 
conditions in order to attract investors . 
156 Stephen Bottomley "Corporati ons and Human Ri ghts" Stephen Bottomley/David Kinley (eds) 
Commercial Law and Human Rights (Ashgate, Burlington USA, 2002) 47 , 51 . 
157 A::urix (A ::urix Corp. v the Argentine Republic (A ward)) (2006) 18 World Trade and 
Arbitration Materials 199. 
158 Siemens (Siemens AG v the Argentine Republic (Award)) (2007) 19 World Trade and Arbitration 
Materi als I 03. 
159 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic {A ward)) above n 66. 
160 Enron (Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v the Argentine Republic (Award)) (2004) 11 
ICS ID Reports 268 . 
161 Sempra (Sempra Energy International v the Argentine Republic {Award)) (2008) 20 World Trade and 
Arbitrati on Materi als 117. 
162 Siemens (Siemens AG v the Argentine Republic (Award)) (2007) , above n 158 , para 81 . 
163 Enron (Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v the Argentine Republic (Award)), above n 160 , 
para 44; Sempra (Sempra Energy International v the Argentine Republic (A ward)), above n 161 , para 
85 ; CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)), above 
n 9, para 32. 
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(a) Azurix Corp v Argentina 
Tn the course of the privatization of water services in an Argentine province, 
Azurix, a US company, founded a local subsidiary called ABA. ABA signed a concession 
agreement with the Province in order to provide the services. The act of incorporating 
ABA as a local subsidiary was necessary as, according to the provinces ' law, the 
concessionary was required to be a company incorporated in Argentina.164 The dispute 
arose when Azurix claimed that the Province failed to comply with its obligations under 
the concession agreement, thus in turn preventing ABA from fulfilling its obligations. 
Azurix alleged that this was in breach of Argentina ' s obligations under the Argentina-US 
BIT, especially of Article II(2)(c): "Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regards to investments".165 Without further explanation, the Tribunal 
held in response to the Claimant's argument that Argentina had failed to observe its 
obligations under Article II(2)(c) that the parties to the concession contract were not 
parties to the proceedings under TCSID, thus not parties to the bilateral investment treaty. 
Even if Argentina were liable of a breach of the investment treaty, the concession 
contract could not be considered as being a contract between Argentina and Azurix. 166 
(b) Siemens v Argentina 
In 1996, Argentina and SITS, a domestic Argentine company but full y owned and 
controlled by the German company Siemens, entered into a contractual relationship 
which concerned the implementation of several electronic systems. After several changes 
regarding the circumstances of the project, which led to a suspension of the production 
twice, Argentina renegotiated the conditions of the contract with Siemens and SITS. 
After a personnel change in the government, contract was eventually terminated under 
Argentine Emergency Law. 167 Siemens tried to invoke Article 7(2) of the Germany-
Argentine BIT, which provided that 
164 Azurix (Azurix Corp. v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction)) (2004) 16 World Trade and 
Arbitration Materials 11 I, para 19. 
165 Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, available at www.un ctadxi.org (last accessed I 0.09.2008). 
166 Azurix (Azurix Corp. v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction)) above n 164, para 384. 
167 Siemens (Siemens AG v the Argentine Republic (Award)) (2007) , above n 158, para 97 . 
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"Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it has assumed 
with regard to investments by nationals or companies of the other 
C . 
p . . . ,, / 68 
ontractmg arty ,n ,ts territory. 
The tribunal simply stated that there was no claim as Siemens was not party to the 
investment contract, and SITS not a party protected under the German-Argentine BIT, 
without providing further explanation, thus barely mentioning the problems in relation to 
the umbrella clause, but declaring them irrelevant in the present case. 
169 
(c) Enron v Argentina 
During Argentina's privatization programme, the US company Enron invested in 
TGS, a local transportation company, in order to take advantage of the favourable 
conditions ofTGS' licensing agreement. Whilst the economic crisis was pending, 
Argentina altered the conditions of the license as a measure to cope with the crisis. In the 
view of Enron, this was, amongst other allegations, in breach of the stabilization clause 
contained in the license. The US-Argentine BIT contained an umbrella clause in Article 
ll(2)(c) .1
70 In its decision on jurisdiction, the Tribunal found that Enron, despite operating 
through a local subsidiary, was the owner of the investment, and the fact of ownership 
was a right protected under the investment treaty. Furthermore, the fact that foreign 
shareholders may have other contractual claims does not affect their direct right of action 
under an investment treaty.
171 The Tribunal noted that Enron's participation in the 
investment was specifically sought by Argentina, which, in the Tribunals view extended 
Argentina's consent to arbitration on Enron.
172 The Tribunal did not elaborate this point 
any further in its award but merely referred to its decision on jurisdiction when discussing 
whether stability clauses in the license had been breached. It then went on to examine 
whether BIT standards had been breached, and applied the umbrella clause to Argentina 's 
168 
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Argentinischen Republik ueber 
die 
Foerderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen , available at www. unctadxi .o
rg (last 
accessed I 0.09.2008). 
169 Siemens (Siemens AG v the Argentine Republic (Award)) (2007), above n 15&, para 204. 
170 See above n 164 . 
17 1 Enron (Enro n Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v the Argentine Republic (Decision on 
Jurisdiction)) above n 160, para 49. 
172 Ibid, para 56. 
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acts without further discussion. In the end, it concluded that through the legislation 
abolishing the favourable conditions for the investor under the license Argentina 
represented a breach of contract, which, by virtue of the umbrella clause, resulted in a 
breach of the investment treaty. 173 
( d) Sempra v Argentina 
This case is very similar to the former cases as it also concerns measures 
undertaken by the Argentinian government with regards to the economic crisis, and the 
effect of these measures on foreign investors. Sempra International invested in two local 
distribution companies in order to obtain licenses in the course of the privatization of the 
gas sector. Sempra alleged that the measures adopted by the government in order to cope 
with the crisis led to a permanent abrogation and repudiation of the conditions of its 
rights under the license. 174 ln the view of Sempra, this violated the umbrella clause, 
Article 25(2)(b) of the United States-Argentina BIT, which provides that the provisions 
are also applicable to 
"and the juridical persons who, having ... the nationality of the State that is a party in the 
dispute, ... and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be 
treated as a national of another Contracting State for purposes of this Convention. " 
The tribunal concurred with the decision in Enron, which stated that even claims 
of minority shareholders were admissible to ICSID arbitration .175 The Tribunal based this 
conclusion on the broad definition of "investment" in the treaty, and found that object 
and purpose of the treaty support this argument. 
173 Ibid, para 277. 
174 Sempra (Sempra Energy International v the Argentine Republic (Award)) , above n 161 , para 93 . 
175 Sempra (Sempra Energy International v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction)) (2005), 
www.asil.org (last accessed 13 .08.2008), 94 . 
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(e) CMS v Argentina 
(i) Award 
The main facts of the case are outlined above. 
176 In its award the Tribunal merely 
referred to its decision on jurisdiction, where the problem was just mentioned. D
uring the 
process of determining the Tribunal ' s jurisdiction, Argentina argued that CMS c
ould not 
invoke the protective provisions of the investment treaty as these were only rele
vant in 
relation to the foreign investor itself and not regarding local corporations. The T
ribunal 
rejected this argument, merely referring to its statement in the decision on jurisd
iction 
which claimed that for the protection of the investment treaty it was irrelevant i
f the 
foreign investor was but part of a party to a concession agreement. 
177 
(ii) Decision on Annulment 
The failure to explain why the Tribunal applied the umbrella clause to a local 
subsidiary eventually was one of the reasons the decision was annulled for failu
re to state 
reasons. 178 In this regard, the Committee identified several issues it would have 
expected 
the tribunal to address, some of which concerned the question of the applicabili
ty of the 
clause to subsidiaries. The Committee argued that contractual obligations and th
e 
performance of such obligations are inter partes, and as an umbrella clause does not 
change the nature of a contractual obligation it also does not change the parties 
to the 
obligation.
179 With regards to the Tribunal ' s interpretation of the umbrella clause in the 
BIT, the Committee found that it was impossible for any reader to follow the re
asoning of 
the Tribunal at this point, leading to an annulment of the award. Even though th
e 
Committee does not give an answer to the question of whether contracts with lo
cal 
subsidiaries are included in the treaty protection, the issues pointed out by the C
ommittee 
provide a useful starting point for further discussion, which can not easily be av
oided by 
future tribunals faced with this problem. 
176 See 3 Only certain contracts covered? . 
177 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Award) , above n 6
6, para 65. 
178 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annu
lment)) (2007), 
above n 9. 
179 Ibid, para 95(c). 
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4 Analysis 
In the context of problems occurring on connection with the operation of an 
umbrella clause in a bi lateral investment treaty, the issue dealt with by these tribunals is 
yet another source of ambiguity, which is displayed by the outcome of the decisions. 
When looking at the Tribunals' lack of explanation for their decisions, one has the 
impression that the relevant points of thought as outlined in the CMS Decision on 
Annulment are either not recognized or deliberately avoided by Tribunals. These points 
should be considered as it does not seem satisfactory just to apply an umbrella clause in 
the case of a local subsidiary as well as to deny application without proper reasoning. 
(a) Issues identified by the Committee in CMS 
(i) Article 25(2)(b) of the IC SID Convention 
Article 25( I) of the Convention extends the jurisdiction of the Centre to "a 
national of another Contracting State", and Article 25(2) defines the term " national of 
another Contracting State" . According to Article 25(2)(b), a national of a contracting 
state is also a juridical person which is a national of the state party to the di spute, but 
under foreign control , and if the parties have agreed that this juridical person should be 
treated like a national of another contracting state. 180 Article 25(2)(b) is designed to 
widen the scope of the tribunal ' s jurisdiction in order to cover investments made by 
foreign investors through locally incorporated companies. 181 If that is the case, no 
recourse is needed to an umbrella clause in the first place as a mechanism to bring 
breaches of investment contracts between host states and forei gn investor ' s local 
subsidies before ICSID. The CMS Committee noted that, when interpreting an 
observance of obligation clause, tribunals should consider whether a broad interpretation 
and the application to local subsidiaries makes Article 25 (2)(b) unnecessary. 182 If the 
provisions of Article 25(2)(b) are not met, for example when there is no or little foreign 
18° Convention on the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, www.wo rld bank.org 
(last accessed 14.08 .2008) 
181 Christoph H. Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commenta,y (Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge, 
2001), 291. 
182 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)), above n 9, 
para 95 
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control or no consent regarding nationality, the question is if thes
e deficiencies could be 
circumnavigated through a broad interpretation of an umbrella cl
ause. 
(ii) Requirements of Article 25(2)(b) 
Article 25(2)(b) requires that a juridical person has the nationality
 of the host state 
that is under foreign control. This element of foreign control is cr
ucial to the application 
of Article 25(2)(b ), and the actual fact of foreign control cannot b
e assumed through the 
existence of an agreement of foreign nationality of a company. 
183 Furthermore, there 
needs to be an agreement between the parties of the dispute, that 
is the host state and the 
foreign investor. Especially the criterion of an agreement between
 the parties deserves a 
closer inspection, as Schreuer states that "A provision in a treaty 
or in national legislation 
does not amount to an agreement between the parties to the dispu
te" . 18
4 Whilst this 
statement refers to a clause in a treaty that provides for the treatm
ent of a company 
incorporated under the host state ' s law but controlled by nationals
 of other parties, in 
essence it supports the CMS Committees conclusion that a treaty pr
ovision cannot be 
interpreted to the effect of replacing or modifying Article 25(2)(b
) of the JCSID 
convention in a way that invalidates the provision.
185 While Article 25 allows the parties 
to narrow the scope of consent regarding who is party in proceed
ings to ICSID, 
186 e 
contrario they may not widen the boundaries of the centre ' s jurisdi
ction, 18
7 especially in 
a way that contravenes the Convention's purpose. Consequently, 
this means that if a 
requirement of Article 25(2)(b) is not fulfilled, an umbrella claus
e can not be extended 
onto a local corporation controlled by a foreign investor, since the
 mere existence of the 
clause does not supplant the agreement required by Article 25(2)(
b) of the ICSJD 
convention. 
183 Chri stoph H. Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary , abo
ve n 182, 31 2 . 
184 Ibid, 308 . 
185 C. F. Ameras inghe " Jurisdiction Ratione Personae Under the Conve
ntion on the Settlement of 
Investment Di sputes Between States and ationals of other State
s" ( I 974- I 975) 47 BYIL 227, 228 . 
186 Ibid , 234 . 
187 Ibid , 91. 
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These considerations show that an umbrella clause can not be given such a broad 
interpretation as to apply to locally incorporated companies under foreign control directly 
as a party to the dispute. 
(b) Local corporations as "investments made by a foreign investor" 
If the foreign investor's subsidies cannot bring claims directly under ICSID by 
virtue of an umbrella clause, it might be considered to regard the local subsidy as an 
"investment" made by the foreign investor, and the breach of contract with the subsidy a 
breach of the host state's obligations to the foreign investor to "observe any obligation 
with regard to the investment". A lot will depend again on the wording of the clause in 
question. A broad clause including "any obligation entered into with an investor or an 
investment of an investor "188 permits the conclusion that domestic subsidiaries are 
included. 189 When this is not the case, the question that needs to be discussed in this 
regard is whether through the breach of the investment contract with the local subsidy, 
the foreign investor has the right to enforce the obligations under the investment contract 
without having duties under the contract himself. According to the CMS Committee, the 
findings of the Tribunal that Argentina had entered into obligations with regard to 
investments made by a foreign investor lead to the strange situation that CMS, being a 
minority shareholder, could not invoke these obligations under national law but instead 
by virtue of the umbrella clause in the BIT before ICSID. 190 The Committee thought that 
this approach was highly problematic, and one of the issues identified is the question of 
who is actually bound by a contractual obligation and who in turn can demand 
performance of obligations. 191 The Committee pointed out that claims protected under the 
umbrella clause are usually bilateral, yet may be linked to obligations of an investment 
company. 192 Whether this link leads to the necessary obligation of the host state under a 
188 For example Article I 0( I) of the Energy Charter Treaty, www.cncha11er .org (last accessed 19.08.2008); 
Article 24( I )(b)(C) of the 2004 US Model BIT. 
189 Thomas Waelde "The "Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 203. 
19° CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)), above n 9, 
para 92. 
19 1 Ibid, para 96; Azurix (Azurix Corp. v the Argentine Republic (Award)) above n 157, para 38 . 192 CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company v the Argentine Republic (Decision on Annulment)) , above n 9, 
para 96 (d) . 
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BIT to the investor was left open. It seems that it all comes down to the 
question of 
whether a foreign investor needs to be a further obligee of an investment
 contract in order 
to bring claims arising out of contractual breaches before ICSID. The Co
mmittee noted 
that observance obligation clauses do not change content and proper law
 of an obligation 
and thus do not change the parties to an agreement. In the case of a legal
ly separated 
parent corporation and a subsidiary, it will be difficult to argue that the p
arent is party to 
a contract if the contract has been concluded between the subsidiary and
 the host state. 
But, regarding the applicability of the umbrella clause, it is not relevant 
who is party to a 
particular contract under domestic law, rather, the question if there is an 
investment of a 
foreign investor is of importance. Some clarity might again be reached b
y comparing 
umbrella clauses with a broad wording as mentioned above, and umbrell
a clauses 
referring only to obligations entered into with "respect/regards to an investm
ent ". l t has 
been suggested that the difference in the wording demonstrates that the l
atter covers only 
investment agreements between the host state and the investor. 
193 Yet this doesn ' t really 
convince as the parties could have well intended to regard a domestic su
bsidiary itself as 
investment. 
194 
The reluctance of tribunals to justify their decisions either in favour of o
r against 
the inclusion of domestic legal subsidiaries under the protective scope o
f umbrella 
clauses demonstrates that there is yet another issue which drafters of suc
h clauses need to 
consider. 
195 The outcome will depend on the parties ' definition of "investment" 
III CONCLUSION 
The effect of umbrella clauses in bilateral investment treaties remains a 
field of 
intense discussion. The very great diversity of opinions, approaches, inte
rpretations and 
solutions will continue to make it difficult to predict further developmen
ts. Up to this day, 
the awards of treaty-based ICSID tribunals tend to sympathise with eithe
r of the SGS-
193 Thomas Waelde "The " Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Com
ment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 203. 
194 Ibid .. 
195 Compare Nick Gallus " An Umbrella just for Two? BIT Obligations Ob
servance Clauses and the Parties 
to a Contract" (2008) 24 Arb lnt'I 157, 169. 
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decisions, which leaves both investors and host states in uncertainty regarding future 
developments and the outcome of future proceedings. This can be ascribed, for the 
greater part, to the many variations in the texts of BITs, but also to the different 
approaches to and interpretations of arbitrators of the positions of states and investors in 
the system of investment protection. The obvious advice for States would be to take 
extreme care when drafting new investment treaties, and to clearly state their intentions 
and interpretation in case of the inclusion of an umbrella clause. But as Tribunals have to 
resolve disputes over already existing treaties, and their number is great, controversies 
over the effect of the umbrella clause and its scope will remain. An end to these 
discussions is not in sight. 
When it comes to the examination of the effect of umbrella clauses on claims 
resulting out of breaches of contracts through states, most tribunals established under 
ICSID are reluctant to give the clause the widest possible scope, that is, to give ICSID 
tribunals jurisdiction over purely contractual claims. In this sense, most tribunal s seem to 
try to find a middle way between SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philippines and try to 
address the problems identified but not solved by these two conflicting awards . This 
seems to be sensible as on the one hand, allowing the clause to apply only to treaty claims 
would deprive it of any independent significance, on the other hand , letting it apply to 
both treaty and purely contractual claims is too expansive, as this might lead to the 
application of international law to claims of which domestic law is the proper law. The 
general intention of states guaranteeing certain standards of protection to foreign 
investors is to attract foreign capital , foreign investment and to profit from the transfer of 
technology often involved with it, in a nutshell , to improve their own economic 
performance. Yet the system of investment protection is not meant to serve as an "all-
purpose remedy" or a "supranational legal system" for disputes in foreign countries, 196 
and investment arbitration should not completely replace domestic judicial of arbitral 
remedies. Therefore, it is legitimate to strike a balance between the protection of foreign 
investors against arbitrary measures based on nationalistic or protectionist motives and 
196 Thomas Waelde "The "Umbrella" Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original 
Intentions and Recent Cases" above n 19, 188. 
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conducted under the pretext of sovereignty, and the expectation that investors ac
cept the 
fact that a certain domestic legal framework applies to their investment which m
ay not be 
as sophisticated as their home country ' s. Furthermore, investors should always b
e aware 
of the fact that they operate in economies that may not be as stable and predictab
le as 
their home state ' s economy. 
Thus it is only sensible to argue that foreign investors should only benefit from 
supplementary protection where domestic remedies and domestic legal systems f
ail 
ultimately. For this reason , the distinction between acts of the state as a merchan
t or as a 
sovereign in abuse of its sovereign powers developed by tribunals and scholars w
hen it 
comes to the applicability of an umbrella clause is a step towards finding the bal
ance 
between conflicting interests of host states and investors. 
Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by the original intentions of the early 
drafters of the clause, who envisaged the internationalization of transnational inv
estment 
protection against the abuse of governmental power in order to constrict the inve
stment. 
The beginning of this development is marked by the Lena Goldfield arbitration, whic
h 
initiated a process that was furthered in the Abs-Shawcross convention and the O
ECD 
draft convention. Even nowadays, where the system of investment protection has
 
changed in a way that it is no longer strictly inter-governmental , but arbitral proc
eedings 
can be initiated by the investor, the original concept has not lost its validity. 
ln this regard , the BIT and umbrella clauses do not play any role whatsoever 
when state behaviour affecting the contract is purely commercial and does not in
volve 
sovereign powers, thus acting as any other investor would and could act. If a stat
e uses its 
sovereign powers in order to influence the contractual agreement, and if this invo
lves an 
abuse of governmental powers with the intention to invalidate the original agreem
ent, the 
protective mechanism of the BIT is invoked by virtue of the umbrella clause. 
The idea of a balance of investor protection and the preservation of certain areas
 
where state remedies need to be invoked also impacts on the issue of whether an 
umbrella 
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clause, if applicable, overrides domestic remedies if their jurisdiction collides with the 
jurisdiction of an ICSrD tribunal. The author concludes that this cannot be the case, as 
here the limits of investor protection need to be highlighted as well. If there is a valid 
clause in the investment agreement providing for the jurisdiction of domestic courts or 
arbitration, then this cannot be swept aside by an umbrella clause, as not only the State, 
but also the investor must be held to comply with its obligations. Any other result would 
undermine host states' readiness to internationally guarantee a certain amount of rights to 
foreign investors that may exceed the rights of their national investors, and also to accept 
the jurisdiction of a tribunal established under a foreign dispute resolution mechanism 
such as ICSID. 
An exception to the primary applicability of contractual jurisdiction clauses must 
be made in situations where an investor cannot find sufficient protection of investments 
through domestic remedies. This is the case when either the investor is denied the 
enforcement of valid domestic awards by the host state, or when the host state's measures 
specifically target the investment as such through certain measures in order to derail the 
investment agreement. Thus it is assured that the umbrella clause is established as a 
substantive treaty standard in an investment contract. 
Another aspect of umbrella clauses that has not been resolved yet is the question 
of whether locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign investors are included in the 
protective scope of the BIT through the application of an umbrella clause. At first glance, 
this seems somewhat strange as strictly speaking they are not " foreign " investors. On the 
other hand , there are good arguments for why locally incorporated subsidiaries should be 
regarded at least as an " investment" of a foreign investor. For one thing, as the legislation 
in connection with the privatization of certain economic sectors in Argentina has 
demonstrated , host states sometimes set up the requirement for concessions that only 
local corporations are entitled to bid for them . Thus, an investor may not have a choice 
but to operate through such a subsidiary, which could be regarded as the investor' s 
"extended arm". It should be kept in mind that Article 25(2)(b) of the JCSID convention 
is a means to explicitly negotiate and agree on this point of question in either direction , 
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be it the exclusion of the inclusion of locally incorporated subsidiaries under a BIT. If 
such an agreement does not exist, then Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID convention should 
not be rendered useless by a broad application of an umbrella clause in order to let the 
local subsidiary file a treaty claim before an ICSID tribunal. Yet it seems possible to treat 
a locally incorporated subsidiary as an "investment" and thus to consider any acts 
negatively affecting a state contract with the local corporation a potential breach of treaty. 
In a way, the disputes arising out of the legal issues in connection with the 
applicability, the effect, and the significance of umbrella or observance of obligation 
clauses is representative for the tasks that ICSID tribunals generally face when dealing 
with substantive treaty standards. As the intention of the parties is rarely clear and the 
BIT provisions are vague and obscure, it is their job to fill them with meaning and to 
shape them. The bulk of cases dealing with the umbrella clause since SGS v Pakistan and 
SGS v Philippines has achieved much in shedding some light on the issues that need to be 
resolved and have presented solutions that future tribunals, but also future drafters of 
B!Ts can use as a valuable source of information and support. 
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